Berle and Means revisited: The governance and power of large U.S. corporations by Mizruchi, Mark S.
Berle and Means revisited: The governance
and power of large U.S. corporations
MARK S. MIZRUCHI
University of Michigan
Abstract. In The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), Berle and Means
warned of the concentration of economic power brought on by the rise of the large
corporation and the emergence of a powerful class of professional managers, insulated
from the pressure not only of stockholders, but of the larger public as well. In the tradi-
tion of Thomas Jefferson, Berle and Means warned that the ascendance of management
control and unchecked corporate power had potentially serious consequences for the
democratic character of the United States. Social scientists who drew on Berle and
Means in subsequent decades presented a far more benign interpretation of the rise of
managerialism, however. For them, the separation of ownership from control actually
led to an increased level of democratization in the society as a whole. Beginning in the
late 1960s, sociologists and other social scientists rekindled the debate over ownership
and control, culminating in a series of rigorous empirical studies on the nature of cor-
porate power in American society. In recent years, however, sociologists have largely
abandoned the topic, ceding it to finance economists, legal scholars, and corporate
strategy researchers. In this article, I provide a brief history of the sociological and
finance/legal/strategy debates over corporate ownership and control. I discuss some
of the similarities between the two streams of thought, and I discuss the reasons that
the issue was of such significance sociologically. I then argue that by neglecting this
topic in recent years, sociologists have failed to contribute to an understanding of some
of the key issues in contemporary business behavior. I provide brief reviews of four
loosely developed current perspectives and then present an argument of my own about
the changing nature of the U.S. corporate elite over the past three decades. I conclude
with a call for sociologists to refocus their attention on an issue that, however fruitfully
handled by scholars in other fields, cries out for sociological analysis.
The field now known as corporate governance dates back to Berle and
Means’s classic work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.1
Interpretations of this work have gone through several waves, but vir-
tually all commentators have acknowledged Berle and Means’s basic
concern: the separation of ownership from control in large U.S. corpo-
rations. Current scholars in the corporate governance area hail mostly
from the fields of finance and law, with a smaller number from or-
ganizational theory and corporate strategy. Although sociologists paid
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considerable attention to this issue from the end of World War II through
the early-1990s, few of them address the topic today. I argue that so-
ciologists’ neglect of this topic in recent years has prevented the field
from considering a range of important issues. My goal in this arti-
cle is to describe the primary sociological treatments of the issue of
corporate ownership and control, to compare them with treatments by
economists and legal scholars, and to suggest ways in which attention
to this area would allow us to address important questions regarding
the nature and extent of corporate political power.
Before proceeding, I note that my focus is primarily on the United
States. There are two reasons for this. First, although there is consider-
able variation in ownership and control patterns across industrialized
nations, the United States is nearly alone in the extent of the dispersal
of its stockholders.2 Ownership remains highly concentrated and, ar-
guably, fused with control, in nations such as France, Germany, Japan,
and South Korea. Second, to do justice to the richness of the cross-
national variation while dealing with the theoretical issues that I am
concerned with would likely require a book-length treatment.3 At the
same time, it is important to note that many of the implications about
ownership and control in the United States have also been posited to
have occurred elsewhere, including Britain, France, and Germany.4
The theoretical issues at the heart of this discussion are thus relevant
to virtually all industrialized capitalist nations, regardless of the ex-
tent to which they have experienced a separation of ownership from
control.5
I begin, then, with a brief discussion of Berle and Means, focusing
in particular on the relevance of this work for debates in sociological
theory. I then describe various interpretations and uses of Berle and
Means by sociologists during the period 1950–1990. Following this
discussion, I examine Berle and Means’s views on the role of the board
of directors – a critical issue in the debate over corporate control –
and the ways in which these views were selectively, and misleadingly,
interpreted by later theorists. I then discuss more recent work in finance
and law, showing the similarities and differences between this work
and sociological work that developed concurrently, and in most cases
independently. Finally, I examine the evidence on corporate control,
both before and since the major changes of the 1980s. I conclude
with a discussion of how one can use renewed attention to this topic
to address significant questions concerning the structure and political
power of corporate elites.
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Background
The Modern Corporation and Private Property appeared in the early
stages of the Great Depression, but it was more a product of the 1920s,
or more generally, the period after 1890 that culminated in the stock
market crash of 1929. Although the book is best known for the au-
thors’ focus on ownership and control, that topic represents only one
component of their discussion. Berle and Means began by arguing that
capital in the United States had become heavily concentrated during
the previous few decades and that this vested a relatively small number
of companies with enormous power. As these firms grew, it became
increasingly difficult for the original owners to maintain their major-
ity stockholdings, and stocks became dispersed among a large num-
ber of small shareholders. The consequence of this dispersal, Berle
and Means suggested, was the usurpation, by default, of power by
the firm’s managers, those who ran the day-to-day affairs of the firm.
These managers were seen as having interests not necessarily in line
with those of the stockholders. Whereas owners preferred that profits
be returned to them in the form of dividends, for example, managers
preferred either to reinvest the profits or, in more sinister interpreta-
tions, to further their own privileges, in the form of higher salaries or
“perks.” Removed from the pressures of stockholders, managers, for
Berle and Means, were now viewed as a self-perpetuating oligarchy,
unaccountable to the owners whom they were expected to represent.
In an examination of the 200 largest U.S. non-financial corporations in
1929, Berle and Means found that 44 percent of them had no individual
ownership interest with as much as 20 percent of the stock, a share that
they viewed as an approximate minimum necessary for control. Berle
and Means classified these 88 firms, which accounted for 58 percent
of the total assets among the top 200, as management controlled. In
only 11 percent of the firms did the largest owner hold a majority of
the firm’s shares.
Berle and Means’s concern about the separation of ownership from con-
trol was not only about managers’ lack of accountability to investors.
It was also a concern about managers’ lack of accountability to society
in general. Berle and Means thus wrote of a small group, sitting at the
head of enormous organizations, with the power to build, and destroy,
communities, to generate great productivity and wealth, but also to
control the distribution of that wealth, without regard for those who
elected them (the stockholders) or those who depended on them (the
larger public). This was hardly a cause for celebration, and Berle and
582
Means, in the tradition of Thomas Jefferson, expressed considerable
concern about this development.
Many postwar sociologists adopted a very different interpretation of
Berle and Means, however. In these works, authored by commentators
such as Daniel Bell, Ralf Dahrendorf, and even Talcott Parsons, the sep-
aration of ownership from control was actually a harbinger of increased
democracy.6 If Berle and Means implied that even elected officials (the
board of directors) could be far removed from and unaccountable to
their voters (the stockholders), this would seem to raise similar con-
cerns about the extent of democracy in the political system. Indeed,
to some thinkers, including Joseph Schumpeter and Seymour Martin
Lipset, it did.7 But most sociologists who wrote on the topic preferred
an alternative interpretation: the separation of ownership from control
actually contributed to the spread of democracy. To explain how and
why sociologists reached this conclusion, some historical digression is
necessary.
The period in the United States between the mid-1890s and about
1920 is often referred to as the “era of finance capital.” Many of
the great trusts, combinations of large numbers of firms that were
combined into huge corporations, were formed in the 1895–1904
period. Prototypical examples included U.S. Steel and International
Harvester, both of which J.P. Morgan formed and controlled. Rudolf
Hilferding wrote about the dominant position of German banks at
the turn of the twentieth century.8 A number of American commenta-
tors, from government officials, including the Pujo Committee of the
U.S. Congress and Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, to muck-
raking journalists such as Ida Tarbell and financial writers such as
Alexander Noyes, made similar assessments of the United States at
the time.9 The United States, in these arguments, was dominated by
a small group of financiers and major industrialists, often working in
groups, through investment banks, commercial banks, and insurance
companies. These groups, the most prominent of which were led by
Morgan (with his ally George F. Baker) and Rockefeller (with his ally
James Stillman), were viewed as dominating the business world and
forging the makings of a “ruling class,” ascendant both economically
and politically. This view of that period is no longer as unanimous as
it once was, as Mark Roe’s work indicates.10 Yet, it informed virtu-
ally all sociological writings on the topic in the period up to the early
1970s.
583
Where disagreement occurred was over what happened after this pe-
riod, from about 1920. Most sociologists believed that the separation of
ownership from control led, as Dahrendorf put it, to the “decomposition
of capital.”11 In Riesman’s words, “the captain of industry no longer
runs business” and thus “no longer runs politics.”12 Echoing this view,
Bell suggested that “[n]o longer are there America’s ‘Sixty Families’
[the title of a popular book from the 1930s] . . . The chief consequence,
politically, is the breakup of the ruling class.”13 In Dahrendorf’s words,
the business community in industrialized capitalist countries (in which
he included Britain, France, and Germany as well as the United States)
had become “a plurality of partly agreed, partly competing, partly sim-
ply different groups.”14 These authors thus conceded that something
akin to a dominant capitalist class existed in the United States in the
early years of the last century but that because of the separation of
ownership from control, this class had dispersed, unable to realize it-
self as a unified block. Because, in the Berle and Means view, the
owners of capital no longer controlled their enterprises and those who
controlled did not own, Dahrendorf went so far as to claim that we had
transcended capitalism altogether. He referred to this presumably new
system as “post-capitalist” society.
Rather than sharing Berle and Means’s suspicion of managerialism as
ushering in a dangerous era of concentrated economic power, American
sociologists and other social scientists thus praised the new system as a
further extension of democracy. This was reflected in statements about
“peoples’ capitalism,” in which the widespread dispersal of stockhold-
ings meant that corporations were, for practical purposes, publicly
controlled, as well as in formulations about the “soulful corporation,”
concerned as much about its position as a respected member of the
community as with its pursuit of profit.15 In fact, the pursuit of profit
was deemed no longer necessary, as great size, market power, and weak
and disorganized stockholders allowed corporate managers to pursue
goals other than profits, including sales, growth, or a combination of
factors.16 Corporate managers, freed from the dictates of stockhold-
ers (as well as bankers and other outside forces), were stripped of the
entrepreneurial spirit, transforming instead to bureaucratic “organiza-
tion men.” To quote Dahrendorf once again, “[n]ever has the impu-
tation of a profit motive been further from the real motives of men
than it is for modern bureaucratic managers.”17 Ownership of capital
no longer mattered even for understanding peoples’ life chances. In
discussing why they chose to focus their study on occupational status
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attainment rather than class, in either a Marxist or Weberian sense,
Blau and Duncan suggested that class, “defined in terms of economic
resources and interests . . . , is no longer adequate for differentiating . . .
[those] in control of the large capitalistic enterprises from those subject
to their control because the controlling managers of the largest firms
today are themselves employees of corporations.”18
Rumblings among economists
Despite its prominence in certain areas of the field, managerialism never
had a major impact on neoclassical economics. The reasons for this are
straightforward. In neoclassical theory, the firm is a unitary actor that
responds to the market. Who controls the firm internally is irrelevant in
this view, because market processes ensure unanimity of responses. For
all of managerialists’ assertions that profit maximization was no longer
necessarily a goal of firms, they mustered precious little evidence to
support their claims. This lack of evidence made their claims relatively
easy to ignore.
In the 1960s, a group of economists began to devise tests of the man-
agerialist thesis. Based on the idea that the motives of corporate deci-
sion makers would be reflected in firm performance, these researchers
classified firms as either owner or management controlled, and then
compared the profit rates of the firms in each group. If, as managerial-
ists suggested, management controlled firms were less profit oriented
than were owner controlled firms, then, these scholars reasoned, the
former should show lower profit rates than the latter. This premise may
be questionable, since it assumes an unproblematic link between mo-
tive and performance when in fact different types of firms may face
different kinds of obstacles. On its own terms, however, the evidence at
best provided lukewarm support for the managerialist thesis. Although
Monsen, Chiu, and Cooley and Palmer found some tendency for owner
controlled firms to earn higher profits than management controlled
firms, Kamerschen found no such effect, and the differences found in
the first two studies were quite small.19 In the most comprehensive
study on the topic, Larner found only negligible differences – slightly
higher profits among the owner controlled firms, but differences of
little substantive significance.20
Other findings were even less kind to managerialism. In a study of chief
executive firings among the 500 largest U.S. manufacturers in 1965,
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James and Soref found that the strongest predictor of dismissals was
the extent to which the firm’s profits had declined in the previous year.21
Whether the firm was owner or management controlled had no signifi-
cant effect. A second major component of the managerialist thesis was
that managerial autonomy increased as a result of increases in retained
earnings, which freed managers from dependence on banks and other
financial institutions for capital. A study by Lintner indicated that in
the three decades (1925–1955) after Berle and Means’s study, there
was virtually no decline in the proportional use of external financing
by U.S. corporations.22 In a later study on the topic, Stearns showed
that the use of external financing as a percentage of total financing fluc-
tuated between 1946 and 1982, staying at relatively low levels during
the 1950s and early 1960s but then rising consistently and significantly
beginning in 1966.23
Although some economists raised questions about the behavioral im-
plications of the managerialist thesis, the approach did attract con-
siderable attention, and even support, from two emerging branches of
the field: transaction cost economics and agency theory (although the
latter was more equivocal). Oliver Williamson, the leading contempo-
rary proponent of transaction cost economics, used Herbert Simon’s
bounded rationality assumption to develop a model in which manage-
rial goals, of which profit maximization was just one, could vary across
conditions.24 In his subsequent work, Williamson drew in part on the
historical analyses of Alfred Chandler to show the importance of man-
agerial decision making.25 The decision to internalize production or
distribution or to rely externally on markets is predicated on the as-
sumption of managerial discretion – that managers have the power to
make these decisions. The title of Chandler’s subsequent book, The
Visible Hand, was an explicit acknowledgement of the active role of
management in directing the firm.26
If the transaction cost approach was based on the assumption of man-
agerial discretion, a model developed around the same time, agency
theory, took the degree of managerial autonomy as far more problem-
atic. More than any approach, agency theory has focused on the com-
plexities and difficulties of monitoring that arise when ownership is
widely dispersed. Although this approach has now spawned hundreds,
if not thousands, of articles, my purpose here is to touch on some of its
key theoretical points. To do this I focus on two of the most important
works within this perspective, the articles by Jensen and Meckling and
Fama and Jensen.27
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Agency theory is in many respects a critique of managerialism. Its pro-
ponents acknowledge the difficulties that emerge with the dispersal of
stockholdings and the rise of management, but they want to address
them within the framework of more conventional economic theory.
Jensen and Meckling begin by distancing themselves from some key
managerialist claims, in particular the rejection of the profit maximiza-
tion assumption. They acknowledge that managers might have motives
that differ from those of owners, and they admit that monitoring these
managers under conditions of wide stock dispersal can be difficult.
The issue, then, is to create an “alignment of incentives,” in which
managers’ interests will correspond with those of owners. Much of the
discussion for both Jensen and Meckling and Fama and Jensen involves
means by which owners can provide effective monitoring mechanisms.
Much of the research within the area involves examinations of the ef-
fectiveness of these various mechanisms. One mechanism proposed by
the authors is the provision of equity to management. When managers
own stock in the firm, they share interests in its performance with the
remaining equity holders. Another important mechanism is to provide
direct monitoring through the appointment of an expert board of di-
rectors, who are constrained to operate in the stockholders’ interest
because of their need to maintain their reputations. A third monitor is
the market, both in terms of its effect on the firm’s stock price and the
related market for corporate control. This last approach is potentially
the most threatening, since it raises the possibility that managers could
be ousted.
Each of these approaches has a potential downside from the perspective
of owners. When managers own stock they divert some of the equity
of the firm to themselves, thus diluting the value of the remaining
owners’ equity. Board members, regardless of their reputation, still
need to be monitored, which could be difficult if stockholders are widely
dispersed. And takeovers can be disruptive, and generally occur only
after the firm’s equity has become devalued, a situation that owners are
unlikely to welcome.
Rumblings among sociologists
For nearly four decades after the publication of Berle and Means’s
classic study, social scientists who wrote on the topic almost unani-
mously accepted Berle and Means’s analysis. This does not mean that
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all social scientists agreed with Berle and Means. As I have shown,
neoclassical economists basically ignored the issue and assumed an
unproblematic link between ownership and control. But those social
scientists who addressed the topic were overwhelmingly in agreement
with Berle and Means, although there were some differences among
them on the implications of Berle and Means’s findings. Two promi-
nent Marxist economists, Baran and Sweezy, for example, went to
great lengths to defend Berle and Means’s empirical findings but with
equal vehemence denied that the separation of ownership from control
had any implications for corporate behavior.28 With the exception of
a highly polemical study by another Marxist economist, Victor Perlo,
there were virtually no published critiques of managerialism between
1932 and 1970.29 Slowly, however, sociologists and other critics began
to raise questions about managerialism.
One of the first such works was an article by a prominent sociologist,
Mayer Zald, who argued that the board of directors played a prominent
role in monitoring corporate management.30 Zald exhorted sociolo-
gists, who had virtually ignored this topic, to pay more attention to
it. Zald’s article, along with a study by an economist, Peter Dooley,
was among the earliest works to raise questions about management
control.31 A study by political scientist Philip Burch, which questioned
the extent of management control, was also influential.32 But the break-
through piece of sociological critique was a 1974 article by Maurice
Zeitlin.33
Zeitlin’s primary dispute was with the evidence on stock dispersal. Re-
turning to Berle and Means’s analysis, Zeitlin showed that nearly half
of the corporations that Berle and Means had classified as management
controlled simply had “no identified center of control,” that is, Berle
and Means were unable to locate a single stockholder with an interest
as large as 20 percent (their cutpoint for minority owner control) and
were unable to conclusively state that the firms were management con-
trolled. Zeitlin thus suggested that no more than 23 percent of Berle
and Means’s firms (the 200 largest U.S. non-financials) were, by their
criteria, clearly management controlled. Even if one accepted Zeitlin’s
critique of Berle and Means, one could argue that the more recent
findings presented by Larner demonstrated conclusively the degree
of stock dispersal. Using a more stringent criterion for management
control, a largest holding of only 10 percent, Larner found that more
than 80 percent of the 500 largest U.S. manufacturers as of 1964 had no
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individual interest with a holding of more than 10 percent.34 Regardless
of Berle and Means’s findings, this suggested that by the mid-1960s,
the managerial revolution was, as Larner put it, “close to complete.”
Zeitlin proceeded to criticize Larner’s findings as well, however, us-
ing material from an article in Fortune, in which the author suggested
that several of the firms classified by Larner as management controlled
were in fact owner controlled.35 On this basis, as well as a reanaly-
sis of Larner’s data, Zeitlin argued that 40 percent or more of Larner’s
firms were owner controlled. Zeitlin also suggested that the quantitative
techniques used by Berle and Means and subsequent authors may have
missed a significant number of firms that were in fact owner controlled
but had no publicly identifiable large stockholder. Using Burch’s find-
ings, based on a detailed reading of the business press, Zeitlin argued
that as many as 60 percent or more of the largest U.S. firms may have
been owner controlled at the time.
Around this time, some authors were also pointing to the potential
power of large commercial banks. Concern about the banks, as I have
noted, dated back to the early part of the twentieth century. Between the
publication of Berle and Means’s book and the late-1960s, researchers
paid virtually no attention to this issue, however. As early as the 1940s,
Marxist economist Paul Sweezy had described “the decline of the in-
vestment banker,” and except for Perlo, not even Marxists were writing
about commercial banks.36 Instead, the banks were viewed as interme-
diaries, whose role differed little from those of accountants and lawyers.
During the 1960s in the United States, a Congressional investigation
chaired by Representative Wright Patman examined the stockholdings
of commercial bank trust departments. Commercial banks in the United
States are not allowed to directly own stocks in non-financial corpora-
tions. Their trust departments manage pension funds for other firms,
however, and they invest in the stock of other firms, stock on which
they have voting rights. The role of institutional investors became a
major public issue during the 1990s, but concerns about it go back
several decades.37 The Patman committee found that about 30 percent
of the 500 largest U.S. manufacturers in 1967 had at least five percent
of their stock held by a commercial bank trust department. Drawing on
this finding and additional data on institutional holdings, David Kotz
argued that as many as 40 percent of the 200 largest U.S. nonfinancial
corporations could be said to be controlled by a bank.38 The potential
power of banks finally gained attention in sociology through a major
project directed by Michael Schwartz, who approached the problem
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of corporate control in a very different way from others involved in
this debate, a way that ironically corresponded in a number of ways
with the agency theory approach that was developing concurrently. I
discuss this project in the following section, but before doing so, it
is necessary to address an important, and overlooked, implication of
Berle and Means’s argument.
Beginning with Berle and Means, corporate control had been addressed
at the level of the firm. Although Berle and Means were sensitive to
the fact that corporate managers faced pressures from groups other
than stockholders, their empirical analysis focused almost entirely on
stockholdings. Firms were classified into one of five categories based
on the size of their largest identifiable ownership share. We must re-
emphasize that Berle and Means were well aware that their scheme
was arbitrary, that control could be exercised in a number of ways,
including by outsiders such as bankers. As they noted, “Occasionally a
measure of control is exercised not through the selection of directors,
but through dictation to the management, as where a bank determines
the policy of a corporation seriously indebted to it.”39 Again, however,
in examining the condition of large corporations in general, Berle and
Means treated control at the level of the individual firm.
Those who later tested Berle and Means’s argument, whether support-
ive or critical, maintained the same approach. Whether it was Larner
demonstrating the “near completeness” of the managerial revolution,
Burch arguing for the persistence of family control, or even Kotz sug-
gesting the possibility of bank control, these approaches all involved
setting a percentage threshold at which the size of a stockholding was
deemed sufficient to ensure control, identifying the largest stockholder,
and then tabulating the number of firms in which this stockholder ex-
ceeded the threshold. The largest firms were classified as 80 percent
management controlled, 60 percent family controlled, or 40 percent
bank controlled, but there was little recognition or acknowledgement
of the possibility that firms might be embedded in a network consisting
of other firms, whose behaviors might have considerable influence on
them.
Zeitlin was particularly concerned with this issue. Corporations, in
his view, were not necessarily independent entities but instead could
be viewed as tools of individuals or family groups who used them
to accumulate capital. If this were the case, he argued, then control
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might be located not with the insiders who ran the day-to-day affairs
of the firm, or even necessarily with large individual stockholders, but
rather with families, financial institutions, or groups of other firms.
Zeitlin and Ratcliff attempted to illustrate this thesis with a study of
corporate control in Chile, in which they found that a detailed ex-
amination of family ownership and kinship ties provided a more valid
portrait of control relations than did application of the Berle and Means
criterion.40 Lewis Corey had recognized a similar point in discussing
the basis of J.P. Morgan’s control at the turn of the twentieth century.
As Corey put it, “The House of Morgan and other financial masters
did not own the corporations under their control. Nor was ownership
necessary. Stockholders being scattered and numerous, control was
easily usurped by minority interests, particularly when these interests
were institutionalized in the formidable combination of the House of
Morgan.”41 Rather than being based on the purely legal criterion of
stock ownership, Corey suggested that Morgan’s control was based on
a complex system of relationships, including “stock ownership, vot-
ing trusts, financial pressure, interlocking of financial institutions and
industrial corporations by means of interlocking directorates, and the
community of control of minority interests.”42
What is especially interesting about this view is its convergence with
Berle and Means on the one hand, and agency theory on the other.
Whereas Zeitlin and other critics of managerialism focused on show-
ing that stockholdings had not dispersed to the extent that manageri-
alists had claimed, Corey suggested that the separation of ownership
from control was precisely what was necessary for financiers such as
Morgan to dominate. Berle and Means were concerned that stock dis-
persal would place power in a small group, unaccountable not only
to stockholders but also to larger constituencies. Corey’s description
of Morgan’s power is strikingly similar. Where Berle and Means and
Corey differed was in their view of who filled this vacuum. For Berle
and Means, it was the managers, those insiders who ran the firm on
a daily basis. For Corey, it was leading finance capitalists, tied to ma-
jor financial institutions whose control spanned several corporations
simultaneously. As I shall argue below, these two views may be more
similar than people realize. Before addressing that issue, however, I
want to note the similarity between Corey’s description and the more
recent versions of agency theory. As Davis and Useem have noted,
monitoring mechanisms within this model are now best viewed as an
“ensemble,” of which there are several different approaches.43 Agency
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theorists continue to focus heavily on the equity market (note that
Corey also acknowledges stock ownership as an important basis of
control), but they also focus on such factors as the appointment of
expert board members and, increasingly, the role of banks and other
external entities.44
To return to Berle and Means, two points are worth mentioning. First,
as we have seen, Berle and Means were more aware of the potential for
external control by principals other than stockholders than is normally
acknowledged. More important, though, is to understand exactly to
whom Berle and Means were referring when they spoke of managers.
Corporations in the United States include, by law, a board of directors
consisting of at least three members, and a senior management con-
sisting of the chief executive and other leading officers. In joint-stock
companies, the board is elected by the stockholders, who then appoint
the CEO. Most current descriptions treat the board and management as
separate groups. Managers are normally assumed to consist of the CEO
and other leading officers of the firm. The CEO and several other top
officers usually sit on the board as well. They are referred to as inside
directors. But the board also consists of people whose primary affil-
iations are with other units, including other firms. Because the other
inside directors are normally subordinates of the CEO, the outside di-
rectors take on a particularly important role, since they are the only
board members whose formal authority is exclusively above that of the
CEO.
Although most contemporary observers distinguish between the board
and management, Berle and Means did not. For Berle and Means,
“managers consist of a board of directors and the senior officers of
the corporation.”45 To be sure, in legal terms, the board is not an in-
dependent entity. As Berle and Means put it, “Since direction of the
activities of the corporation is exercised through the board of directors,
we may say for practical purposes that control lies in the hands of the
individual or group who have the actual power to select the board of
directors . . .”46 Note, however, that for Berle and Means, the board (1)
is a component of what they call management and (2) directs the activ-
ities of the corporation. Because their key point about the separation of
ownership from control is that managers become a self-perpetuating
oligarchy, this means that it is the board, and not simply the officers,
whom Berle and Means view as in control of the firm. Simply because
Berle and Means held this view does not mean that is correct, of course.
It is entirely possible that the managers have usurped power from the
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board in the same way that the board took power from the stockholders.
This has in fact been the dominant view among those who have studied
board-management relations. For the moment, though, let us assume
that Berle and Means were correct, and address the implications of
their view.
Directors and relations among firms
The outside directors of large U.S. firms tend to be officers of other
leading firms. They may represent leading customers or suppliers, or
consist of bankers, lawyers, or accountants who provide legal or fi-
nancial advice, or simply friends or trusted allies of the CEO. When
members of the board of one corporation sit on the board of the other,
the tie they create is referred to as an interlocking directorate, or an in-
terlock. The existence of interlocks has been the source of both interest
and concern for at least a century.
Much has been written about interlocks, and there is little need here
to add to this huge literature.47 It may be worthwhile to specify why
they have been important to study, however. We saw earlier that a
major consequence of the managerial revolution was assumed to be
the dispersal of power among the leading capitalists and financiers of
the early twentieth century. Interlocks were seen by many observers as
a crucial indicator of this concentrated power. Perhaps the most famous
statement was provided by Justice Louis Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme
Court in his classic book, Other Peoples’ Money.48 Drawing on the
findings of the Pujo Committee, Brandeis recounted the large number
of connections among major banks and leading railroads and industrial
firms. He then issued his now-famous quote:
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It of-
fends laws human and divine. Applied to rival corporations, it tends to the
suppression of competition and violation of the Sherman law49 Applied to
corporations which deal with each other, it tends to disloyalty and to viola-
tion of the fundamental law that no man can serve two masters . . . It is the
most potent instrument of the Money Trust. Break the control so exercised
by the investment bankers over railroads, public-service and industrial cor-
porations, over banks, life insurance and trust companies, and a long step
will have been taken toward attainment of the New Freedom.50
Two things are worth noting in this passage. First, interlocks are seen
as creating problems for the efficient working of the market economy.
Ties among competitors (which were outlawed in the Clayton Act of
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1914, adopted shortly after Brandeis wrote) reduce competition within
industries, thus driving up prices, and ties between customers and sup-
pliers create conflicts of interest, in which the board member cannot
serve the best interests of one set of stockholders without simultane-
ously harming the interests of the other. Second, interlocks are both a
cause and consequence of the concentration of power in a small elite,
a phenomenon that may have serious implications for democracy.
We have now come full circle. Earlier we saw how the separation of
ownership from control was used by some sociologists as evidence for
the dispersal of power and the spread of democracy. But Corey, in his
study of the House of Morgan, noted that the separation of ownership
from control actually made it easier for a small group of finance cap-
italists to exercise power. Brandeis, as did Corey and other writers of
the period, suggested that interlocking directorates were one means by
which this power was exercised. And sociological managerialists did
not dispute the point, at least initially. Instead, they tended simply to
ignore the issue, based on the assumption that widespread interlocks
were a product of an earlier age. Nearly alone among sociologists of the
postwar period (C. Wright Mills, who took a very different position,
was another exception), Arnold Rose spoke explicitly to the issue, even
stating that “[i]nterlocking directorates, where they occur in the larger
corporations, give them a high degree of cohesiveness.”51 This did not
pose a problem for Rose, however, because he simultaneously asserted
that “interlocking directorates are the exception rather than the rule.”52
The presumed significance of interlocks noted by the critics of corpo-
rate power in the early twentieth century, authors of studies by U.S.
government agencies in the 1930s and 1950s, and the few sociologists,
such as Mills and Rose, who addressed the topic suggested that the
phenomenon would be an important one for critics of managerialism
to address.53 The first sociologist to examine the topic comprehen-
sively was Michael Schwartz, who teamed with a group of students to
produce a number of studies. In a series of works, Schwartz and his
colleagues demonstrated that nearly all of the largest U.S. corporations
were connected into a single network through interlocks.54 The most
central firms in these networks were primarily the largest commercial
banks and insurance companies, suggesting that they played a special
role in the business world.55 My study, which looked at interlock net-
works at seven different points between 1904 and 1974, revealed that
major financial institutions were the most central firms during the entire
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70-year period. Although the density of the network declined between
1912 and 1935, following passage of the Clayton Act, nearly all of the
largest firms remained tied together in a single network.
These studies raised a number of questions. It is now known, for exam-
ple, that in even random networks of people, individual actors will be
able to reach most others within a relatively small number of steps.56
Although Mintz and Schwartz provided a number of individual case
studies of relations between banks and non-financial firms, and I found
strong correlations between the structure of the networks I observed
and historical evidence from the early twentieth century, it was unclear
whether the connections among the firms reflected the cohesion of the
business community, the power of financial institutions, or neither.
There were reasons to believe that centrality in the interlock network
was associated with a firm’s power. A considerable amount of evidence
from network studies suggested such a correlation in other contexts,
although more recent work suggests that the relation is more compli-
cated than network analysts originally realized.57 One reason to ques-
tion whether centrality implied power was our limited knowledge about
the specific meaning of the interlocks. This limitation in part reflected
our lack of knowledge about the nature of corporate boards. Once soci-
ologists began to demonstrate the ubiquity of interlocks, managerialists
– no longer able to rely on Rose’s assertion that interlocks were rare
– altered the basis of their critique. Two factors were now at issue:
First, what were the behavioral consequences of interlocks? Did the
interlocks that firms maintained lead them to behave differently from
the way they would have behaved in their absence? And second, what
if directors were not powerful, but instead were merely figureheads,
appointed by or at the behest of the CEO, either unwilling or unable to
confront management over policy?
Both of these issues were subsequently addressed, but I want to focus
first on the role of the board. Berle and Means might have viewed
the board as controlling the firm, but they were writing in the early
twentieth century. By the time most of the later managerialists were
writing, managers had become defined exclusively as the officers of
the firm. The board, meanwhile, was now seen as a group of largely
passive figureheads, appointed and dominated by the CEO. Examples
of this view were plentiful. Myles Mace, in his classic work on boards,
for example, suggested that “the powers of control usually rest with
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the president – not with the board . . . It is the president who, like the
family owner-managers in the small corporation, determines in large
part what the board of directors does and does not do.”58
There are a number of reasons that boards over time might have lost
power to managers. Although Berle and Means’s primary focus was
on the dissolution of stock ownership, the growing complexity of the
corporation and the consequent need for professional managers was
cited by a number of managerialists as a reason for the development of
management control in the first place. In the early twentieth century,
outside board members frequently represented controlling interests, as
when J.P. Morgan personally selected the entire boards of U.S. Steel and
International Harvester. But in later years this control was less evident.
In my historical analysis, for example, the proportion of interlocks be-
tween financial and non-financial corporations that involved officers of
the financial firm sitting on the board of the non-financial (as opposed
to vice versa) declined from 65.2 percent in 1912 to 46.2 percent in
1974.59 The phenomenon of banks placing one of their officers on the
board of a non-financial as a means of control seemed to be a thing of
the past by the 1960s.60 Instead, bank boards became arenas in which
representatives of several industries convened, perhaps to discuss con-
ditions in the economy as a whole.61 Even those bank officers who sat
on non-financial boards appeared as likely to have been invited in an
advisory capacity as to have demanded a position as a means of exer-
cising control. And the reasons for this, if true, are not difficult to un-
derstand. Corporate CEOs who sit as outside directors on the boards of
other firms are full-time employees of their home firms. The amount of
commitment and expertise necessary to monitor the CEO of another
firm thoroughly may be prohibitive. In addition, having been appointed
by someone who is likely to be a friend, there may be few incentives
to ask difficult questions or provoke confrontations. The more boards
on which an individual sits – and some leading CEOs sit on a half-
dozen or more – the less energy one has to monitor the firm carefully.
When Lorsch and MacIver asked whether board members were pawns
or potentates, the answer from these earlier discussions was clearly the
former.62
If these views were accurate, then they raised serious questions about
the meaning of corporate interlocks. Certainly interlocks might reflect
friendship patterns within the corporate elite, as many of Mace’s sub-
jects suggested, or they might reflect resource dependence relations
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among customers and suppliers, as theorists such as Pfeffer and
Salancik argued.63 But the idea that they represented either control
relations among firms, or mechanisms of political unity among the
corporate elite, seemed increasingly farfetched.64 Interlocks, contrary
to Arnold Rose, may indeed have been ubiquitous, but this may not
have had the meaning that even Rose would have attributed to it.
As compelling as these latter-day managerialist views were, however,
they too rested on a thin empirical foundation. In fact, even where
evidence of board passivity was abundant, conceptual difficulties in
these arguments rendered such passivity difficult to interpret. It was
in this context that I developed a critique of the managerialist model
of boards.65 Interlocking directorates were widespread, and their fre-
quency and pattern seemed consistent with a cohesive corporate com-
munity led by major financial institutions. For this view to have any
possible credence, however, it was necessary to demonstrate that boards
of directors played a meaningful, as opposed to a merely titular, role
in corporate governance.
My approach to this problem was to draw on a model of power devel-
oped in political sociology and political science. Debates in political
science around the concept had culminated in three general positions,
only two of which need concern us here. Power may, on one hand, in-
volve the exercise of overt control over another actor, either through
direct commands or through victory under conditions of conflict. Po-
litical scientists such as Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby acknowledged
that power may at times be difficult to observe, but they insisted that the
only way to demonstrate its existence would be to identify instances in
which it was observable. The best examples, they suggested, were cases
of political issues on which various actors had opposing views. Those
whose positions regularly prevailed could be said to have power.66
Although there was little disagreement that consistent achievement of
one’s objectives was indicative of power, critics of Dahl and Polsby
argued that power is often far more subtle, and that those aspects in
which it is most difficult to observe may be precisely those in which it is
most operative.67 The issues that never reach the public for discussion
because powerful actors were able to keep them off the agenda represent
one such example.68 Scholars such as Mills argued that the areas of
overt conflict were those that had the least significance, and that the
major decisions were made by a small, largely unified, group.69
597
A similar argument could be made about boards, I suggested. Board
members may have less knowledge of the internal workings of the
firm than do the top managers. They may make few, if any, decisions
over long periods of time, instead essentially “rubber-stamping” the
suggestions of the CEO. They may appear to be passive, disinter-
ested, and fully co-opted. And yet none of this necessarily indicates
that they lack power. A key variable, I argued, is the financial con-
dition of the firm. Regardless of how active a board is, its members
hold the responsibility of both appointing and, if necessary, removing
the CEO. It may be that board members appointed after the ascen-
dance of the current CEO are more beholden to him or her and thus
less likely to be critical. As one CEO told Mace, however, “if you
get a lot of guys from the outside, even though you pick them, you
lay yourself open to a takeover deal.”70 In other words, even direc-
tors who are appointed after a CEO assumes his or her position may
still find it necessary to remove the CEO if the firm experiences diffi-
culty. Board members who fail to do this make themselves vulnerable
to stockholder lawsuits. The prevalence of outside directors, declines
in performance, and the threat of lawsuits as well as takeovers, all
make the firm’s top management potentially vulnerable to the board.
When times get tough, we often see the CEO removed. The ouster
of General Motors’ CEO Robert Stempel in 1992 was viewed in the
business press and by many scholars as a stunning event, but evi-
dence reaching back through the 1980s and 1970s,71 and even into the
1960s,72 not to mention the many well-publicized cases in the early
2000s, suggests that the board stepping in to oust the CEO is far from
rare.
The idea that the board was a passive tool of management was therefore
an exaggeration, I argued. Although the actual extent of board power
clearly varied across firms, the potential and at times necessity to exer-
cise their power was always there, even when it appeared dormant for
years at a time. Ironically, this argument, although somewhat different
in focus and style, was in substance similar to those implicit in the
works of agency theorists. As we saw above, these theorists acknowl-
edged that the board might have difficulty monitoring management
under certain conditions. That they found it necessary to mention this,
however, suggested that they viewed the board as normally in control.
As agency theory made its way into organizational analysis, the view




Shortly after the publication of “Who Controls Whom?,” organiza-
tional analysts began to focus on the role and behavior of corporate
boards. Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin presented a model of
factors that might account for CEO dismissal, several of which in-
volved board structure and behavior.74 Baysinger and Hoskisson and
Walsh and Seward followed this with models of the conditions under
which boards would be most likely to monitor managers.75 Fredrickson
et al. were concerned primarily with the ways in which board mem-
bers’ values and allegiances affected their likelihood of dismissing a
CEO, and they drew primarily on organizational theory to develop
their model. Baysinger and Hoskisson and Walsh and Seward drew
explicitly on agency theory in establishing a set of contingencies un-
der which boards were most likely to act. Like my piece, these three
articles were primarily theoretical. Empirical works had also emerged
during this period, however. This literature is large, and much of it is re-
viewed elsewhere.76 But regardless of whether researchers used agency
theory, organizational analysis, or more sociological perspectives, this
work repeatedly demonstrated that boards of directors had significant
effects on firm behavior.
In one such study, Kosnik used agency theory to show that firms with
high proportions of outside directors were less likely to engage in
“greenmail,” the repurchase of company stock at inflated prices, than
were firms with high proportions of insiders. She used this finding to
suggest that firms with higher proportions of outside directors were
more effective.77 Cochran, Wood, and Jones and Singh and Harianto
found, contrary to expectation, that firms with outsider-dominated
boards were more likely to provide golden parachutes (lucrative sev-
erance packages) for their CEOs than were insider dominated firms.78
Wade, O’Reilly, and Chandratat identified a possible variable to ac-
count for this paradoxical finding: whether the outside directors were
appointed by the particular CEO.79 Wade et al. found that the greater
the number of outsiders appointed after the CEO assumed power, the
greater the likelihood of a golden parachute package, although this
effect held only for management controlled firms.80
In addition to work on boards per se, several other researchers have
demonstrated that director interlocks have effects on firm behavior.
Davis found that adoption of takeover defense plans known as “poison
pills” diffused through interlock networks.81 Haunschild found that
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firms whose CEOs sat on the boards of firms that had recently engaged
in acquisitions were more likely to engage in acquisitions themselves.82
I showed that pairs of interlocked firms were more likely than pairs of
non-interlocked firms to engage in similar political behavior.83 And
Palmer found that firms with interlocks with commercial and invest-
ment banks were more likely than non-interlocked firms to be the target
of friendly, as opposed to hostile, takeover attempts.84
Not all of the studies of board structures and interlocks have demon-
strated the predicted effects. Contrary to Palmer, Davis and Stout found
no association between the presence of a banker on a firm’s board
and the firm’s likelihood of being a takeover target, and Fligstein and
Brantley found no association between bank interlocks and merger ac-
tivity during the 1970s, although in a subsequent study, Fligstein and
Markowitz did find such an association during the 1980s.85 The clear
conclusion from the full corpus of work within this area, however, is
that boards of directors, and director ties between firms, have significant
effects on a wide range of corporate behaviors.
The growing emphasis on boards among business scholars (and some
sociologists) during the 1980s and 1990s reflected the widely held
belief that managerial autonomy had declined over the previous two
decades. Although this view was largely implicit in most of the research
cited above, other scholars were more explicit about the hypothesized
decline in managerial discretion, including the possible resurgence of
stockholders. I turn to this issue in the following section.
Revolt of the owners, decline of the banks
As Useem has noted, managers were under increasing pressure from
stockholders as we moved into the 1980s.86 The U.S. stock market
had performed poorly during the 1970s. Companies were in relatively
weak equity positions. In the agency theory view that emerged con-
currently with this development, these firms were “undervalued,” ripe
for takeover by alternative management teams that would “right” the
company, thus increasing its stock price. The 1980s seemed to bear out
the predictions of the agency model, as nearly one-third of the Fortune
500 received takeover bids during the decade.87
Just as managers were becoming increasingly vulnerable, however, an
interesting development occurred, slowly at first but gathering steam
into the 1990s: the decline of the commercial banks. Before detailing
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this development, it is worthwhile to ask exactly what the purported
role of the commercial banks was. Early bank control theorists, going
back to Hilferding and Lenin, argued that banks, through their control
of capital, exerted broad control over nonfinancial corporations.88 Later
proponents of this view believed, to varying degrees, that banks could
actually dictate the policies of the firms they controlled. In Kotz’s view,
this was a result of the banks’ ability to vote the stock held by their
trust departments.89 In Fitch and Oppenheimer’s more colorful (albeit
less sober) analysis, the banks were willing to suck capital out of the
firms they controlled, even if it drove the firms to bankruptcy.90 Both of
these views were disputed even by other Marxist or Marxist-oriented
analysts. Both Sweezy and O’Connor viewed the bank control model
as a fiction, an attempt to apply a decades-old argument to a world that
had long passed it by.91 In a thorough, careful analysis, Herman ac-
knowledged that banks might occasionally exercise control, but argued
that such situations were rare.92 In Herman’s view, management ruled.
In fact, in acknowledging the power of managers while at the same
time expressing concerns about their lack of accountability, Herman’s
work stands as the most worthy successor to Berle and Means.
Sensitive to the concerns expressed by Herman and others, Mintz and
Schwartz rejected a crude bank control model.93 Banks rarely become
involved in running particular firms, they argued. Instead, they sug-
gested, the banks exercise a broad level of “hegemony” over non-
financial firms, able to set the conditions under which these firms oper-
ate. Because capital is a universal and highly demanded resource, and
because (Mintz and Schwartz claimed) firms were incapable of raising
sufficient capital on their own, they depended on the banks, as well as
other financial institutions such as insurance companies. Firms were
unable to play competing banks off against one another because most of
the major financing schemes involved consortia, cooperative relations
among the banks, in many cases dozens on the same deal. The banks’
views were neutral. They simply allocated capital where they saw the
best likely return. To maintain their knowledge of developments across
multiple industries, the banks invited the CEOs of a range of leading
firms to sit on their boards. These boards thus became meeting places
for the leaders of the business community, a kind of economic version
of the Business Roundtable. The board of the former Chase Manhattan
bank, for example, had no fewer than 14 CEOs of Fortune 500 firms in
1982. This new role of bank boards, which emerged after World War II,
explained for Mintz and Schwartz why the direction of bank interlocks
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had changed during the twentieth century from primarily bank officers
sitting on non-financial boards to vice versa. Still, the leading banks
remained by far the most central firms in the network of interlocking
directorates.
As we have seen, agency theorists, although not making any global
claims about bank dominance, developed an entirely compatible argu-
ment. Just as with equity holders, lending banks had an investment in
the firm that required monitoring. Whether by placement of an officer
on the borrower’s board, voting the stock held by its trust department, or
inserting restrictive covenants into its loans, agency theorists viewed
banks’ need to monitor as an important component of the lending
process.94 Exactly how large a role bank monitoring, or even stock-
holder monitoring, played in a general sense remained beyond the scope
of those working within this approach, however. This is significant, be-
cause just as Mintz and Schwartz’s book appeared, and agency theory
formulations about the potential power of banks emerged, a change was
occurring that would have significant implications for both models.
Beginning in the early 1980s, rapid changes in technology and the reg-
ulatory environment led U.S. corporations to reduce their reliance on
banks for capital and led individuals to reduce their deposits in commer-
cial banks. Both the number of commercial banks and the proportion of
corporate debt acquired from commercial banks declined by one-third
between 1979 and 1994.95 Large commercial banks responded to the
loss of their traditional franchise by changing their focus from lending
to financial services, such as capital market services, foreign currency
exchange, and derivatives. Although banks faced declining margins
on domestic lending, overseas lending, although more risky, promised
higher returns. Bank profits, which had declined precipitously in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, rebounded by the mid-1990s. This change
in bank strategies had the effect of altering the social role of com-
mercial banks within the American business community: as Davis and
Mizruchi document, the largest banks substantially reduced the num-
ber of executives of major corporations appointed to their boards, thus
losing their place at the center of the interlock network.
It appears almost self-evident that leading commercial banks would
have shifted their operations overseas during this period. An examina-
tion of the evidence suggests otherwise, however.96 The tidal shift to
overseas operations among major American banks occurred not during
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the 1980s and 1990s but during the 1960s. In the more recent period
there has been very little expansion. In fact, the number of U.S. banks
operating overseas declined between the early 1980s and 2000, and
most of the foreign presence that remains is dominated by two banks,
Citigroup and Chase.
The findings described by Davis and Mizruchi have an interesting im-
plication. The evidence of the decline in the power of U.S. commer-
cial banks is quite strong. U.S. non-financials’ reliance on the banks
for capital has declined significantly. The banks have moved instead
to financial services, activities that are profitable but that do not lend
themselves to the accumulation of great power. A study, by Stearns and
me, of corporate relationship managers in a major commercial bank
revealed the typical bank/non-financial relation to be a far cry from
anything described by Mintz and Schwartz.97 Importantly, however,
the fact that the proliferation of alternative sources of capital corre-
sponded with the sharp decline of bank centrality suggests that Mintz
and Schwartz may have been correct about the period in which they
were writing. Critics cannot have it both ways. Either the banks were in
fact powerful into the early 1980s, or the declines that we observe over
the past twenty years are not really significant. Both views may actually
have a grain of truth. Davis and Mizruchi suggest that the banks’ declin-
ing centrality was likely to have been voluntary.98 As they shifted from
lending to financial services, there may have been less reason to have
Fortune 500 CEOs on the board. The banks instead tried to look like
investment banks, firms that did not typically play host to non-financial
CEOs. This scenario suggests that the banks have not lost their ability
to accomplish their economic goals, but that their shift in focus has
inadvertently reduced their political power within the business com-
munity. We do not know if this is the case. But the fact that we do not
know is precisely the problem, and precisely what we need to address.
Who controls, and who cares?
I began this article with a discussion of Berle and Means, but I wanted
to focus on a particular, and neglected, aspect of that classic work:
Berle and Means’s concerns about the concentration of power. Their
views on the concentration of economic power were quite explicit,
albeit largely ignored by subsequent interpreters. But embedded in their
argument was an equally important concern: the potential concentration
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of political power, an issue prominent in American political thought
going back to Thomas Jefferson. In their concluding paragraph, Berle
and Means suggested that
The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic
power which can compete on equal terms with the modern state . . . Where
its own interests are concerned, it even attempts to dominate the state. The
future may see the economic organism, now typified by the corporation, not
only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the
dominant form of social organization.99
Mid-century interpreters of Berle and Means, drew a considerably more
sanguine set of conclusions from the managerial revolution, as we have
seen. The separation of ownership and control in this view had led to
greater democratization. But others, along with Berle and Means, saw
more ominous implications.
The period from the 1950s into the 1980s saw a ferocious debate among
American social scientists over the concentration of political power in
the United States. Although the debate was complex, two primary views
predominated, a pluralistic model and an elite model. In the former,
power was seen as either widely dispersed or episodic. Occasionally,
in this view, well-organized elites were able to achieve control, but
only temporarily, until an organized opposition arose to knock them
(through electoral means) from their pinnacle. In the elite model, power
was viewed as concentrated among a unified, self-perpetuating group
whose members were unaccountable to the majority. Occasionally, in
this view, the masses were able to achieve certain victories, but these
were seen as the exception rather than the rule.
In the early years of this debate, evidence accumulated on both sides.
Pluralists showed in a series of studies that elites often did not get
their way,100 and that they often fought one another.101 Elite theorists
showed that members of a small group, with privileged social back-
grounds, similar educational experiences, and both family and social
connections, were disproportionately represented in important institu-
tional positions.102 Although the early work within the elite perspective
did not succeed in undermining the pluralist view, subsequent studies
became increasingly sophisticated. A critical tenet of pluralism was the
assumption of a divided elite. Even if a small group of elites dominates
politically, as long as there is competition among them, the public can
always replace the group that is in power with another segment of the
elite. This, according to Schumpeter, Lipset, and other theorists of the
period, was an important prerequisite for democracy.103 The studies of
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interlocks described above were attempts to address this question. As
research by critics of pluralism multiplied, pluralists largely abandoned
the area, although there were notable exceptions such as the important
work by Laumann and Knoke, which used network analysis to move
beyond a simple pluralist model.104 Meanwhile, advances within the
elite tradition, both theoretical and empirical, continued. Useem ar-
gued that both pluralists and elite theorists were correct, but that each
focused on a different level of analysis.105 When one looked at busi-
ness as a whole, conflict was the rule, but when one considered only
a small group of leaders of the largest firms – that is, individuals who
spanned several firms simultaneously – this “inner circle” was capa-
ble of forging a unified position, Useem argued. Similarly, Whitt, in a
study of several mass transportation initiatives in California, showed
that although there were differences in interests and views among ur-
ban economic elites, organizations existed that allowed these elites to
reach a unified position prior to lobbying the state.106
Building on these theories, I argued that the entire question of whether
business was politically unified was misplaced.107 I suggested instead
that business unity is a conditional phenomenon. Sometimes business
is unified and sometimes it is not. The point, then, is to identify the
conditions under which business unity and conflict occur. I found, in
a study of political behavior among large U.S. corporations, that inter-
firm ties created by such factors as economic interdependence, common
ownership, and director interlocks, were associated with the extent to
which firms engaged in similar political behavior. Even this study, based
on data from 1980, showed the prominent role of banks, however. Firms
whose equity was held by the same institutional stockholders (primarily
bank trust departments at the time) and that were indirectly interlocked
through the same banks and insurance companies were significantly
more likely to engage in similar political behavior than were firms
without such ties.
The problem in more recent years, however, is that things appear to have
changed. As we have seen, Davis and Mizruchi have documented the
declining centrality of banks in the U.S. corporate interlock network.108
Few sociologists any longer write about the role of economic elites, or
study such processes.109 U.S. firms (although not, as we have seen, U.S.
banks) have become more global. The banks’ political position within
the business community has declined. Older, visible families such as
the Rockefellers have disappeared. And yet we do not know what, if
anything, has arisen in their places.
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Are there some accounts that we could apply to the contemporary situ-
ation? I mention here four possible arguments, and then offer a position
of my own. The first, associated most prominently with Domhoff, sug-
gests that the locus of power has changed little since the early-1980s.110
In this view, the U.S. economy is still dominated by a relatively small
group of generally cohesive elites, perhaps less visible than in earlier
years, but no less real. Instead of older, prominent families such as the
Rockefellers and Mellons, Domhoff argues that the U.S. elite is now
dominated by a later generation of individuals, most of whom continue
to come from relatively privileged origins. The general character of the
system, one in which this small group, through its business and policy
organizations, advances its interests through infiltration and control of
the state, remains intact.
A second view, advanced most prominently by Useem, suggests that
institutional stockholders have become the dominant center of power
in U.S. business.111 This is a result not only of the continued increase
in their holdings over the past three decades but also because as the
sizes of their holdings increase, the ability to display their dissatisfac-
tion with corporate policy by selling their stock becomes more limited.
As a consequence, Useem suggests, institutional investors have be-
come increasingly active in attempting to influence corporate policies
directly. Despite the potential power of these institutional investors,
Useem makes no claim that they constitute a cohesive elite such as that
described by Domhoff, or even the “inner circle” described by Useem
himself in his earlier work. He acknowledges that some leading in-
stitutional investors represent long-standing, powerful, and connected
firms such as Citigroup and Bankers Trust (although the latter, as of
this writing, is owned by Deutsche Bank). Those who manage com-
pany pension funds are increasingly tied to professional rather than
intra-class networks, however.112
A third, related argument has been suggested by Davis.113 Drawing on
the Davis and Mizruchi study described above,114 Davis argues that
there is no longer a single, identifiable group of dominant economic
actors in the U.S. economy. Rather, pressures for both firms and the
state to conform emanate directly from the capital market, whose influ-
ence has increased significantly since the early-1980s. The absence of
a single dominant group does not mean that managers are autonomous.
In fact, pressures from the capital market render managers less pow-
erful today than during the heyday of managerialism in the 1950s and
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early-1960s, Davis argues. The difference is that there is now no sin-
gle, consciously organized interest that oversees business as a whole in
the way that, according to Mintz and Schwartz, the leading banks did.
Not even institutional investors per se constitute such a group. Instead,
corporate managers face pressure from an amorphous, but no less real,
source. The implication is that this may leave them in an even more
precarious situation than during the periods of family or bank control.
Finally, a number of scholars have suggested that with the increas-
ing globalization of financial markets, national governments have lost
the ability to regulate their own business communities.115 If these for-
mulations are accurate, it would appear to follow that business elites
have become increasingly intertwined over time, leading to the possi-
ble disappearance, or at least dispersion, of national corporate elites.
There is some evidence that the discussions about the globalization
of finance are exaggerated, both in terms of their magnitude (more
than 80 percent of economic activity continues to take place within
national boundaries) and in terms of their historical uniqueness (the
proportion of economic activity across national boundaries in 1997,
although considerably higher than in 1970, was approximately equal
to the level in 1914).116 It is also unclear whether corporate elites at the
turn of the twenty-first century have any greater power with respect to
their states than their counterparts had in earlier decades. I cannot even
begin to address this issue here.117 The degree of internationalization
of the corporate elite is clearly an area that warrants greater scrutiny,
however.
Drawing on these perspectives, I propose an argument of my own.
Although the evidence for my claim is in no way conclusive, it allows
for a suggestive portrait of the changes in the power and cohesiveness
of the American business community over the past three decades. I
argue that a paradoxical situation has emerged, in which individual
firms have an increasing ability to pursue their narrow self-interest –
even to the point of engaging in illegal activity – while the business
community as a whole is less able to act collectively, even when such
coordination would be beneficial to the vast majority of firms.
From the postwar period well into the 1970s, the U.S. business com-
munity, although pervaded by internal conflicts, remained relatively
unified at the top. The presence of the inner circle, described by Useem
in his earlier work, allowed leading members of the corporate elite to
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maintain a long-term outlook, in which they sought to forge a uni-
fied conception of the global interests of the business community. This
group was supplemented by the major commercial banks, which shared
an interest in mediating inter-firm disputes and protecting the long-term
interests of business as a whole. Concurrent with this situation was the
simultaneous existence of a relatively strong labor movement and an
activist state, both of which enjoyed a high degree of legitimacy among
business leaders and the larger public. The entire system was buttressed
by a strong national economy.
As we moved into the 1970s, however, this arrangement began to crum-
ble. Increasing foreign competition began to weaken major U.S. firms.
The energy crisis triggered further economic instability, leading to
the unprecedented coexistence of high levels of inflation and unem-
ployment. Capital shortages increased the relative power of banks but
weakened the system as a whole. By the late 1970s, U.S. business found
itself in a relatively precarious position.
In response to this, the American business community launched a vigor-
ous counteroffensive, a phenomenon that has been well documented.118
For the first time in decades, leading corporate interests began to attack
the legitimacy of both labor unions, which were blamed for low pro-
ductivity (and thus high inflation), and the interventionist state, which
was blamed for excessive regulation that left U.S. firms unable to com-
pete internationally. This counteroffensive culminated in the election of
Ronald Reagan to the presidency and a shift, which has continued to the
present, away from activist government toward a more laissez faire eco-
nomic policy, now referred to as “neo-liberalism.” Supported by sym-
pathetic officials from the Reagan Administration, corporations now
began a successful offensive against labor unions. The government, as
David Vogel has noted, was so eager to serve the business community
that firms in some cases received more than they had demanded.119
The upshot of these developments was that two of the key forces that
had disciplined the business community and contributed to its long-
term focus – labor and the state – were no longer viable. Meanwhile, as
we moved into the 1980s, commercial banks began their two-decade de-
cline as arbiters of inter-industry disputes. The consequence of this was
a paradoxical situation in which business appeared to lack any kind of
unifying institution that would be the source of a long-term perspective,
while at the same time its power seemed virtually unchallenged. This
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unchecked power, combined with the absence of disciplinary forces,
either internal (the banks) or external (labor or the state), may have
contributed to the excesses of the late-1990s and early-2000s, includ-
ing the Enron scandal. If this account is correct, then individual firms
are increasingly able to operate without the restraints, even from within
the business community, that firms faced in earlier decades. A power
vacuum thus exists at the top of the U.S. business community, a func-
tion, I would argue, of the decline of both the commercial banks and
the inner circle.
My argument, of course, is only speculative at this juncture. Little
evidence exists either in support of or opposition to it. But that is
exactly my point: Because few sociologists are addressing questions
about the nature of the U.S. corporate elite, the four preceding ar-
guments, as well as mine, remain in the realm of supposition. What
is needed to address these issues is a renewed attention to the study
of corporate control: the ways in which this control affects, and is
affected by, inter-firm relations; the structure of the corporate elite (in-
cluding whether it makes sense even to treat the corporate elite as a
distinct entity); and the nature of business political activity, includ-
ing analysis of how such activity relates to the character of inter-firm
relations.
Conclusion
It is clear, I hope, from this overview of the field, that much has been
learned about corporate ownership and control and the structure of
the business community, both in the United States and overseas. It
is equally clear, however, that whatever was known about these top-
ics over the past several decades, very little is known in more recent
years. The question remains as to why the issue of corporate con-
trol and the structure of relations among firms should matter. For an
answer, we have to return to Berle and Means. The corporation has
undergone a number of transformations, and social scientists have had
a difficult time developing theories to keep pace. Regardless of its
changes in form, focus, ownership, and control, it remains a domi-
nant institution in contemporary industrialized economies. Berle and
Means were concerned about the corporation because of its power
and its impact. Economists have every right to be concerned about
ways to monitor management to increase and preserve shareholder
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value. Investors risk their capital when they invest in a firm, and they
have a right to expect that those who represent them will be respon-
sive to their concerns, in the same way that voters for political can-
didates do. But just as elected officials are not necessarily responsive
to their constituents, corporate officials are not necessarily responsive
to theirs. And whether we believe that corporations have a respon-
sibility to the larger community, their actions affect that community
nevertheless. The debates of the 1970s and 1980s did not resolve the
question of the nature of corporate political power in capitalist soci-
eties. But at least social scientists were trying to answer the question.
This topic no longer holds a central place in the fields of sociology
and political science, yet there is no shortage of issues that cry out for
attention.
It is unclear what new studies of corporate power will reveal. Corpo-
rations appear to be acting largely on their own, but they face pres-
sures from stockholders, and the capital market in general, that man-
agers did not face 25 years ago. Given the declining importance of
banks, on the other hand, corporate managers may also have a degree
of autonomy that their predecessors lacked. That corporate interests
may exert increasing power in the electoral arena does not necessarily
mean that corporate power as a whole is increasing. As Robert Dahl
noted many years ago, for a group to be powerful requires not only
resources, but also unity.120 Corporations pursuing their own inter-
ests, without an organized mobilization, may cancel each other out,
as Dahrendorf and Galbraith suggested in an earlier era.121 On the
other hand, evidence for the diffusion of corporate behavior across
networks is large, and continues to grow, even based on contempo-
rary data. What implications do these networks have for corporate
political behavior? Is business mobilized at anything approaching its
level in the late-1970s? Is business collective action less necessary
now than it was then, because of the successes of the past? Can busi-
ness be a powerful political actor simply by virtue of its structural
position and the consequences, even inadvertent, that its behavior gen-
erates? Who benefits, and who loses, from scandals such as those that
rocked the corporate world at the turn of the century? Can we identify,
in specific terms, the role that the globalization of economic activ-
ity has played in domestic politics? Sociologists seem less concerned
about issues of corporate control and power than they did two decades
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